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Abstract
It is argued that, contrary to the widespread impression, a relational account
of spacetime is plausible.
1 Introduction
The ontology of physics is a difficult soil to seed. Leibniz and Newton planted the
arena of discussion. They were concerned in the debate over the ontological status of
space and time. In the post-relativistic era the debate is still persuasive, facing re-
lationalists against substantivalists in this issue. Einstein shifted the battlefield from
the ontology of space (plus time) to the ontology of spacetime. It is worth to mention
that Einstein’s original intention was to cast GR’s spacetime as a relational entity a`
la Leibniz-Mach. However, despite early relational interpretations of GR -such as Re-
ichenbach’s (1928)- most philosophers of science feel comfortable with the now standard
sophisticated substantivalist (SS) account of spacetime (Mundy:1992, Brighouse:1994,
Di Salle:1994, Hoefer:1996, Pooley: 2002). Furthermore, most philosophers share the
impression that although relational accounts of certain highly restricted models of GR
are viable, at a deep down level, they require substantival spacetime structures. I have
reasons to disagree, but before bringing them out into the light I will briefly recall some
history in order to describe what sophisticated substantivalism is about and why it is
troublesome.
Back in the 70s the increased interest in relativistic cosmology in addition to the
expanding scientific realism made people confident in the literal reality of theoretical
GR structures. Now, a model of GR, broadly speaking, consists of a manifold and some
(matter and metric) fields spread over the points (events) of the spacetime manifold.
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Consequently, within the realm of scientific realism it seemed natural to understand the
point manifold as an independent background substantival spacetime containing physical
fields. The manifold had become the successor of Newton’s absolute space container
(Earman 1970, Stein 1970, Friedman 1983). Furthermore, it is a basic structure of our
best theories and the corresponding field equations suggest that physical fields should
be considered as integral properties of the points of the spacetime manifold.
However, this conviction in the independent existence of spacetime in the form of
the manifold was broken in the late 80s. Spacetime philosophers went on to reconsider
manifold substantivalism when they were forced to struggle against the interpretative
complications brought out by the hole argument. The hole argument was the rediscovery
-in differential geometry language- by Earman and Norton (1987) of Einstein’s own hole
argument dating back from 1913. At the time, Einstein thought that general covariance
-the key to the hole- failed to conform consistently to the ’law of causality’. Likewise,
in its modern version, the hole argument was intended to put forward an interpretative
obstacle: If interpreted along realistic lines GR should be accounted as a nondetermin-
istic theory. This proposition is, evidently, contrary to the usual understanding of the
theory inherited from its current scientific practice. As a result different responses to the
hole argument have populated the literature. Some of them opted to reject the type of
indeterminism within the hole construction since it seemed physically irrelevant, others
went on to modify spacetime substantivalism. This is the case of spacetime sophisticated
substantivalism (SS). This latter substantivalist doctrine (SS) is usually presented as the
natural escape from the hole argument. In Hoefer’s words, as ‘the best way of cashing
out substantivalism’ (1996,p.6). Since the hole argument is well known nowadays I will
offer a brief overview.
2 The Hole Argument
The possibility of the hole construction comes from the active general covariance of GR.
By definition, this means that if any tensor field X on the manifold M is a solution
of the corresponding field equations, then the so called pushed-forward tensor φ ∗X of
X is also a solution of the same field equations for any active diffeomorphism φ. As
stated previously a model of GR -taken usually to represent a possible world- consists
on a differential manifold (M), a metric tensor field (g) defined over the whole manifold,
and a stress-energy tensor field (T) representing the material contents of spacetime.
Two models of GR, U = 〈M, g, T 〉(M, g, T ) and U∗ = 〈M,φ ∗ g, φ ∗ T 〉, related by
a difeomorphism φ share the same background point manifold, but the action of the
diffeomorphism pushes the fields (g, T ) onto different manifold points. To build the
hole argument, it is convenient to choose a spacetime M admitting a (3+1) foliation
consisting of 3-spacelike slices labelled by a time parameter t. After doing so, one can
pick the diffeomorphism to be the identity up to t (say t = 0) and differ thereafter. As a
result, one has two models of GR identical up t = 0 but smoothly different afterwards.
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This should be taken as a failure of determinism within GR since the field equations plus
the past cannot single out a unique evolution of fields within the manifold1.However one
should be careful when judging this type of determinism breakdown. The standpoint is
that the hole argument becomes effective if one grants primitive identity to the manifold
points; if one is willing to be a manifold substantivalist.
In this case each diffeomorphic model would represent an ontologically distinct state
of affairs. Things would be, loosely speaking, somewhere else after t = 0. The problem
comes when one notices that the field equations plus the past cannot pick between
U = 〈M, g, T 〉 or U∗ = 〈M,φ ∗ g, φ ∗ T 〉 to determine which of the two (or more) models
represent the factual history. All diffeomorphic models of GR are empirically equivalent;
they share the same background manifold but the field equations (plus the past) cannot
tell, for example, if a star W collapses at point p of M , or at point r of M . The hole
construction clearly resembles the Leibniz shift argument against Newtonian substantival
space, where, by means of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII), Leibniz was
able to conclude that a hypothetically shifted world and a non shifted world represented
the same state of affairs since they were observably (dynamically) identical given the
invisibility of absolute space and the principle of relativity. The argument involved and
implicit rejection of primitive identity of space points, otherwise the shifted and the non-
shifted world would represent different states of affairs. In the language and context of
GR, PII is known as Leibniz Equivalence (LE).
LE can be stated as follows: two field distributions related by an active diffeo-
morphism represent the same physical situation, this is, U = 〈M, g, T 〉 and U∗ =
〈M,φ ∗ g, φ ∗ T 〉 are equivalent for any φ ∈ Diff(M). Where Diff(M) is the set
of all possible diffeomorphisms defined on the same manifold M .
There have been several reactions to the hole argument, but the general conclusion
most philosophers have shared is that, as stated by Earman and Norton, ‘determinism
is worth a fighting chance’. Consequently, most philosophers endorse LE, thereby they
reject primitive identity of spacetime manifold points. I agree.
3 Points unidentified: ¿Relational or Substantival
Spacetime?
The hole argument is constructed under the strong belief that substantivalism is a real-
istic doctrine about the independent existence of individual manifold spacetime points.
This way of presenting substantivalism makes it sound as if relationalism consisted pri-
marily in the denial of the statement that ‘spacetime points enjoy this robust sort of
existence’ (Belot and Earman 2001, p. 227). I have to disagree. Recall the situation
in Newtonian dynamics. Despite the impossibility to single out space points, almost
1In Einstein’s original version the diverging manifold diffeomorphism was not necessarily in the
future, it was placed anywhere within the manifold; hence the hole terminology.
3
everyone granted physical reality to Newtonian absolute space. Why was it so? The
real issue at stance was that Newtonian space encompassed important spatiotemporal
structures that played an important explanatory role in dynamics2.
Mach (1883), for example, suggested that an alternative relational dynamics would
have to, somehow, put together a novel inertial structure depending explicitly on material
sources. It was clear that the reality of space was linked to the explanatory power of its
inertial structure and not to the robust existence of its individual parts (points). For
that reason, I find more accurate and healthier for the current controversy to consider
substantivalism as realistic doctrine about the independent existence of spatiotemporal
structures (not points)3. I quote Hoefer’s definition along this line of thought (Hoefer
1996, p. 5):
A modern-day substantivalist thinks that spacetime is a kind of thing which
can, in consistency with the laws of nature, exist independently of material
things (ordinary matter, light, and so on) and which is properly described
as having its own properties, over and above the properties of any material
things that may occupy parts of it.
Hoefer is speaking as a sophisticated substantivalist. Evidently, I find his general
definition convincing. Nevertheless, I will shortly show my discomfort as to the clas-
sification of ’material things’. As stated earlier, SS is advertised as the best escape
from the hole argument. Thus, a Sophisticated Substantivalist subscribes LE, is some-
one who is realist about the independent existence of spacetime but, contrary to the
manifold substantivalist, she does not grant the bare manifold the ontological status
of a complete independent spacetime. One of the compelling reasons to do so, aside
from the hole argument, is the fact that the bare manifold can work as a collection of
points with certain differential and topological structures, but lacks practically of every
paradigmatic property required to properly understand it as an independent spacetime
in its own right.
Of course, to look for the paradigmatic properties of an independent spacetime it is
convenient to recall -once more- Newtonian dynamics. Newtonian absolute space (or,
alternatively, neo-Newtonian spacetime) is widely considered as an independent entity in
its own right mainly because it had all the structures that made theoretically intelligible
the idea of one single body moving without relation to anything external (matter). On
the other hand, the bare manifold structure is incapable of defining spatial -or temporal-
distances, it does not contain any inertial (affine) structure, and furthermore, it does
not allow any distinction between past and future. In brief, the manifold is far from
filling the paradigmatic role provided to classical dynamics by Newtonian absolute time
and space or, alternatively, by neo-Newtonian spacetime.
2The alternative neo-Newtonian spacetime, removes absolute space (rest), keeping the full inertial
(affine) structure of Newtonian space without any need of reference to identified points.
3Relationism would then be the denial of this thesis, i.e the non-independence of spacetime structures
from matter objects (particles or fields).
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It sounds paradoxical enough to envisage the manifold as a spacetime without space-
time structures. The lacking spatiotemporal structure, is essentially metrical structure.
Therefore, the manifold requires additional structures to be cast as substantival space-
time. This is why sophisticated substantivalists claim that the couple manifold + metric
(M, g) plays the role of a realistically constructed substantival spacetime in GR. In GR,
the metric tensor field (g) plays the explanatory role provided by Newtonian absolute
space to classical dynamics. From this perspective it might seem suggestive to cast the
metric tensor field (g) as a substantival entity. But things don’t fit so smoothly. SS
has done well in revealing the weakness of manifold substantivalism. However when
the g-field is judged as a pure substantival structure, even from the standpoint of the
Newtonian inherited perspective, things start to get twisted.
The metric field carries energy-momentum. This is a distinctive feature of physical
matter fields. Relationalists can therefore question -as the few remaining seldom do- the
alleged substantival ontological status of the metric field.
How do we interpret the gravitational field? Should it be understood as a matter field
a la par with every other physical field or as a spacetime structure? Why candidly raise
the metric field to the status of an independent spacetime? What about gravitational
waves and the energy carried (and released in stellar collapse) by gravitational fields
with no sources?
The conflicting issue is that GR incorporates fundamentally geometry, gravity and
inertia in the same field: the metric tensor field. In Newtonian physics (in field theo-
retic presentation) geometry and inertia are structural qualities of space, whereas the
gravitational field is a physical matter field. Under these circumstances, Sophisticated
Substantivalists (most philosophers) pick geometry and inertia -the spatiotemporal or
chronogeometrical structures- to support their ontological doctrine, whereas Relation-
alists, such as Stachel (1993) and Rovelli, pick the gravitational structure of the metric
field to support their own doctrine. This is how Rovelli pictures the whole thing(Rovelli
1997, p. 193):
Einstein’s identification between gravitational field and geometry can be read
in two alternative ways:
i.as the discovery that the gravitational field is nothing but a local distortion
of spacetime geometry; or
ii.as the discovery that spacetime geometry is nothing but a manifestation
of a particular field, the gravitational field.
The choice between these two points of view is a matter of taste, at least as
long as we remain within the realm of nonquantistic and nonthermal general
relativity. I believe, however, that the first view, which is perhaps more
traditional, tends to obscure, rather than enlighten, the profound shift in the
view of spacetime produced by general relativity.
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Like Rovelli, I find convincing the relational interpretation of the metric field (ii), but
at this point one can imagine why Rynasiewicz (1996) has argued that the debate is
outmoded, or why Saunders (2002) delineates some kind of relationism neutral as to the
matter/space distinction. Giving up -I believe- is not the right thing to do, and to avoid
the matter/space distinction in the relationalist/substantivalist debate seems far away
from the core of the original Leibniz-Newton controversy.
As in the case of Newtonian dynamics, the Special Theory of Relativity (SR) incorpo-
rates basically geometry and inertia -the same structures- to the substantival qualities of
space (or spacetime). Likewise, the gravitational field is presented as a physical field. In
this sense, SR perpetuates Newtonian tradition. Things are quite different in GR. Saun-
ders and Rynaciewicks’ uneasiness is understandable given that the theoretical structure
and the explanatory role of the metric field in GR are usually judged taking as only ref-
erence the Newtonian dynamics tradition. And we have seen that from the Newtonian
perspective there seems to be no possible clear cut distinction in order to settle a fair
triumphant side in the debate. ‘It seems like a mere choice of taste’.
The reason, I believe, why the substantival interpretation of spacetime has become
more traditional is, tautologically speaking, the power of tradition. Newtonian dynamics
-paradigmatic theory of our ideas about matter, space and time- is unanimously under-
stood as a substantivalist theory of space (and time). Concerning space and time, GR
is taken as the accepted inheritor or replacement of Newtonian dynamics. Accordingly,
most physicists, astrophysicists and cosmologists have aligned, following the Newtonian
tradition -the only tradition-, along the substantival spacetime interpretation of GR.
Most philosophers of science have also taken this interpretative path but, when facing
the interpretative difficulties and ambiguities of GR, there ought to be more persuasive
arguments than mere historical inertia.
Certainly, when turning back to the original Leibniz-Newton dispute one sees that
substantivalism turns out prima facie triumphant since Newton was able to successfully
formulate dynamics. But condemning relationalism based upon Newton’s success seems
like atavistic obstinacy. Therefore, to give relationalism a fair chance, one can also put
forward the following hypothetical questions: What if Leibniz -or some leibnizian like
Mach- had had a good relational theory? What role would geometry play in this type
of theory? Would it be natural to view geometry and inertia as intrinsic properties of
substantival space -if not spacetime? Would it still seem natural to interpret the metric
field of GR along substantival lines regardless of the fact that it also encodes important
material properties such as energy-momentum? Would Rovelli’s -and almost everyone’s-
choice between geometry (i.) and gravitational field (ii.) be rightly formulated?
I believe these sort of counterfactuals are adequate to spread important doubts over
the SS account of spacetime. According to the SS account of spacetime, one should view
the metric field of GR as the modern version of a realistically constructed spacetime
since it has the properties -or contains the structures- that Newtonian space had. But
then again, if we imagine that Leibniz had had a good relational theory of classical
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dynamics we can readily envisage the alternative explanatory role of certain alleged
substantival structures. Leibniz considered space as nothing else than the full set of
relations amongst coexisting material objects. Geometry in this type of leibnizian theory
should function as a structure that codifies the set of metrical relations amongst material
coexisting bodies. If the leibnizian theory does the job, would it be sound then to
come up with the conclusion that geometry per se is a pure relational structure and
that, consequently, GR is to be interpreted as a genuine relational theory? I think
everyone will answer in the negative to this question. But, this type of hidden reasoning
is employed by several philosophers who find it natural to emphasize the geometrical
character of the g-field to defend substantivalism. If we put side by side Newtonian
dynamics and a Leibnizian relational alternative, geometry seems rather neutral in the
relationalist/substantivalist dispute. It works as a structure that codifies certain matter
relations in one case, and It works as a structure that describes substantival space or
spacetime in the other. A similar argument can be applied to topological and inertial
structure. Thus, using the geometrical (or metrical) character of the g-field per se in
support of a substantival interpretation of spacetime puts substantivalism standing on
very fragile grounds. Geometry seems to be proving nothing against the material nature
of the g-field. Further arguments should be provided. On the other hand, the relational
account of spacetime seems to have important reasons to consider the g-field as a physical
matter field. It generates the gravitational field structures; it carries energy-momentum
and, equally important, it is a dynamical object field. All these are distinctive qualities
of material objects, even when judged from the Newtonian perspective.
I have argued that the popularity of the SS interpretation of spacetime is broadly
accepted, largely, due to the atavistic burden of Newtonian dynamics. With the pur-
pose of giving relationalism a fair chance, I have proposed the exercise of imagining that
Leibniz, Mach, or any Leibnizian, had been able to successfully formulate a relational
dynamics. This hypothetical theory would allow us to remove part of the historical iner-
tia within the current controversy. Turns out that this need not be a mere hypothetical
exercise of imagination in view of the fact that Barbour and Bertotti (BB2, 1982) have
provided and alternative relational formulation of classical dynamics.
4 Relational Dynamics
BB2 is a relational theory in the sense that it is formulated in the relative configuration
space satisfying Poincare’s criterion. In Newtonian dynamics spatial coordinates (ri, r˙i)
are expressed relative to some inertial frame (i.e. in the absolute configuration space).
Poincare (1905) noticed that if, in the equations of motion, these coordinates were
replaced by purely relative quantities (rij, r˙ij), then by means of the mere knowledge
of the relative configuration of a Newtonian system of coexisting particles, and of the
relative velocity at which they move, it is not possible to unequivocally determine the
future evolution of the system.
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One can picture the problem as follows: Let us suppose that two successive snapshots
of a world made up by N point particles (mi) are taken. These particles move in Eu-
clidean space according to Newton’s laws. The two snapshots slightly differ intrinsically,
and reveal the relative distances between material bodies only. Temporal separation
between the snapshots is also not known. (The snapshots were printed in transparent
paper) ¿Would it be possible, in this case, to univocally determine the future evolution
of the particle system? The answer is, plainly, NO. What is happening is that part of
the background spacetime structures, such as the whole family of inertial frames and
the absolute temporal metric, is lost.
Recovery of the temporal metric would amount to full knowledge of the elapsed time
between snapshots. Recovery of the inertial system structure would amount, on the
other hand, to fixing the snapshot camera. This way we would be able to know what
points of space were successively occupied by material bodies. This recovery procedure
is equivalent to setting and a-priori equilocality relation. Now, for relationalists the idea
of fixing a camera in order to identify the points of space is an anathema. This was,
in my opinion, for long time Newton’s substantial advantage. O. Pooley and H. Brown
clearly state this issue as follows (Pooley y Brown 2001, p. 185 ):
Newton effectively postulated a preferred equilocality relation between the
points of space at different times and a primitive measure of the temporal
distance between them in order to associate with every body an unambiguos
measure of its motion. His equilocality was defined by the simple persistence
of the points of space.
Now, the obligatory problem, according to a relational ontology, would be how to
define an alternative equilocality relation from the mere knowledge of the relative con-
figuration of material point particles. Barbour and Bertotti proposed a procedure called
Best Matching (B-M). Informally, it can be described as follows:
Let us suppose that the two snapshots of the system are printed in a transparent
paper that reveals only points at different locations that have different color intensities
proportional to each particle’s mass. The first snapshot is held fixed. The second snap-
shot is then moved around it until is brought into the closest fit (B-M). Formally this is
achieved by a variational principle. Both snapshots are labeled by arbitrary Cartesian
coordinate systems and when best-matched two points having the same particle location,
in both snapshots, are declared equilocal. This amounts to a suitable definition of rela-
tional coordinate system, and of a metric in the relative configuration space that allows
the determination of the distance δxi between the positions of a particle mi at different
times (the two snapshots). The new coordinates emerging are said to be horizontally
stacked. This new equilocality relation defines a new set of relational coordinates that
dispenses with Newtonian dynamics use of the independent inertial frame structure.
They are relational in the sense that the B-M framework is set to give a coordinate
independent objective measure of the intrinsic difference between relative material con-
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figurations. When two relative configurations are horizontally stacked, coordinates do
not represent positions in some inertial system. Rather, they represent particle positions
in some arbitrary Cartesian system. The resulting Equilocality Relation is a measure,
so to speak, of the maximum congruence between relative material configurations. It
has not been defined by the ‘simple persistance the points of space’ in time.
After solving the problem of equilocality (defining relational intrinsic coordinates) a
new geodesic-variational principle is set to describe the evolution of the whole system
in the relative configuration space. BB2 uses a Jacobi-Type principle that formally
dispenses also with Newtonian absolute time metric. The resulting BB2 theory meets,
as said before, Poincare’s criterion in the sense that the dynamical evolution of the
a particle system is univocally determined from the mere knowledge of the relative
configuration (relative distances and velocities) of the bodies. Neither absolute time, or
absolute space are used.
It should be mentioned, that the best matching machinery was developed to be prop-
erly extended to the field theoretic framework. This allows one to better understand
physical fields as extended material objects, given that two relative field configurations
can, similarly, be brought up to closest fit and, again, a Jacobi-type variational principle
can be set up to determine the evolution of the physical system dispensing with the back-
ground substantival structure. This is readily achieved within the geometrodynamical
representation of GR (Barbour et al., 2002, Anderson et al., 2003).
In the Best-Matching framework, the geometrical structure of the planes of simul-
taneity -in classical dynamics- and the whole differential and topological structure of
the manifold -in both classical an generally relativistic dynamics- are used as important
structural qualities of the whole set of relations amongst material bodies. But these
structures acquire only a pure relational meaning given that only the intrinsic variation
of relative material configurations is physically meaningful within this formalism. The
intrinsic theories make use of relational coordinates that, at no level, presuppose the
existence of a containing physical space inhabited by particles or/and fields. Particles
do not occupy absolute space, nor fields fill a topological space (M). The background
substantival space -or spacetime- is completely eliminated via B-M.
Turning back to the main issue, the important point I want to draw attention to is the
fact that Barbour and Bertotti (BB2, 1982) have provided and alternative formulation
of classical dynamics. They provide a ‘genuinely relational interpretation of dynamics’
(Pooley and Brown 2001). Geometry and inertia become -contra SS- relational structures
in BB2. There is no real sense in which geometry and inertia can be said to be intrinsic
properties of classical space, so the usually alleged interpretation of the g-field along
substantival lines is strongly undermined.
As stated before, on the other hand, the relational account of spacetime has im-
portant reasons to consider the g-field as a physical matter field. It generates the
gravitational field structures; it carries energy-momentum and, equally important, it
is a dynamical object field. All these are distinctive qualities of material objects in
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both Newtonian dynamics and the recently introduced alternative intrinsic relational
dynamics (BB2).
I want to briefly stress out the latter point: Matter is linked to dynamical objects
in physical theories. I believe this general consensus should not be broken just to save
an ontological doctrine. The Sophisticated Substantivalist also ignores the material
dynamical nature of the g-field. In doing so, she wishes to have a clear cut distinction
between spatiotemporal structures, and material object structures. We have seen that
this is not the case in GR when judged from the Newtonian perspective.
However this alleged distinction works out pretty well in the case of Newtonian,
neo-Newtonian, and Minkowski models. The separation between matter and space-time
seems to be clearly defined in these cases. To illustrate it, let us suppose we have an
ensemble of physical fields (electromagnetic, gravitational, dust fluid fields, etc.) living
in their corresponding Newtonian, neo-Newtonian or Minkowski space-times. In this
cases a model can be represented as follows: ℵ =〈M,h,Γ, φ, ρ, E, ...〉. Where M is the
manifold, h is the metric structure, Γ is the affine connection or inertial structure, φ is
the gravitational field, ρ is a fluid density that can represent any conventional matter
distribution, E is the electromagnetic field, and the suspension points correspond to any
other kind of matter we wish to include in the model.
In all these pre-GR models h and Γ are understood as substantival spacetime struc-
tures, whereas φ, ρ, E and others, are material objects. Now, it is well known that in
these models, h and Γ are absolute objects representing spacetime. On the other hand,
matter is represented by dynamical object fields (φ, ρ, E, ...). An absolute object is a
theoretical object that retains its structure in all models of the theory. An absolute ob-
jects partially determines the evolution of matter without it been affected back. These
absolute objects are usually characterized by their symmetry group and the effect of the
corresponding symmetry transformations is to move or drag along the physical fields
preserving the background absolute structure. On the other hand the dynamical ob-
jects, such as φ, ρ, E, ..., change from model to model according to their respective field
equations4.
In GR models (〈M, g, T 〉) g and T are dynamical object fields. Then again, it seems
quite stubborn to ignore the material nature of dynamical object fields -common to
all models of pre-GR theories- just to save an ontological doctrine. Thus, it seems
obstinate enough to ignore the dynamical material nature of the g-field. I believe, then,
that GR is more naturally interpreted as a relational theory where a material dynamical
object field g has finally absorbed the spatiotemporal structures. We have also seen that
this spatiotemporal structures receive a genuine relational treatment in the alternative
intrinsic dynamics.
Everything is matter according to GR. There is no such thing as an independent
spacetime. This was Einstein’s own late conclusion (Einstein 1954 Apendix V, P.155):
4The distinction between absolute and dynamical objects is originally due to Anderson (1967 p.
83-84) It has been well developed by Friedman (1984 p. 47-60)
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There is no such thing as empty space, i.e. a space without a field. Space-
time does not claim existence on its own, but only as a structural quality of
the field.
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